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A THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR UNDER UNCERTAINTY* 
M.K. Block and J.M. Heineke 
In this paper we are concerned with the effects of uncertainty on household decisions. In particular we are interested 
in the response of a single economic agent's factor allocations to "changes in the amount of uncertainty" with which the 
agent's beliefs regarding his income are held. For problems of choice under uncertainty the recent work of Arrow [1], 
Sandmo [9, 10, 11], Leland [5, 6], Stiglitz [12], and others clearly testifies to the power of the expected utility hypo-
thesis as an analytical framework. In what follows two models are examined in which the agent is assumed to be con-
fronting a two period planning horizon and making a joint labor-saving supply decision in the expected utility sense. 
Although Sandmo [10] and Leland [5] have investigated the effects of uncertainty on the savings decision and Block and 
Heineke [4] have investigated the effects of uncertainty on the labor decision, to our knowledge no general treatment of 
the effects of uncertainty on the joint labor-savings decision has been done.l It will be shown that the assumptions 
underlying the Sandmo-Leland analysis are not sufficient to generate their savings results in the more general household 
model. Additional assumptions are presented that are sufficient not only for the Sandmo-Leland savings results, but which 
also provide the requisite preference information for an analysis of the labor decision. 
Our analysis is divided into three cases: The case of (1) "pure income uncertainty"; (2) wage uncertainty; and (3) 
savings rate uncertainty .2 In each case attention is focused upon the response of the factor supply decisions of a risk 
averse agent to pure dispersion changes. 
I 
2 
The following definitions are used. 
w 
s 
X 
the agent's consumption level in period i, i = I ,2. 
the amount of labor supplied. 
the wage rate. 
total income in period i, i = 1 ,2 . 
autonorr.1us income in period i , i = 1 ,2 . 
the amount of Y 1 saved, S = Y 1 - c1 
the rate of return earned on savings 
the agent's cardinal utility indicator, which is assumed to be continuous and to 
possess continuous first, second and third derivatives. 
A specia l case of the joint labor savings decision is investigated in Block and Heineke [ 3]. 
The formal difference between "pure income uncertainty" and uncertaint y in the return to a fa ctor lies in the manner in which uncer-
tainty affe ts the decision variables, which in turn is a crucial determinant of the q ualitative properties of the models. 
Dr. Block (Ph.D., Stanford University) is Assistant Profes~or of Economics at the University of Santa Clara. His publica-
tions appeared in Criminology, the Journal of Applied Economics, and the Review of Economic Studies. 
Dr. Heineke (Ph.D., University of Iowa) is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Santa Clara. His 
publications appeared in the American Economist, the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economic Studies, 
the Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Santa aara Business R eview. 
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As is well known, a general analysis of the response of an agent's decisions to changes in the "amount of uncer-
tainty" in a system requires more detailed information about preference orderings than the agent's simple behavior toward 
risk (risk aversion or preference). An appealing method of providing additional information is to postulate plausible hypo-
theses concerning the agent's behavior toward risk as the various decision variables change. For example, a risk averse 
individual may become relatively less risk averse as his income increases. This hypothesis, Arrow-Pratt decreasing absolute 
risk aversion, has been widely utilized and has yielded many interesting results.3 
Designating Ri= - Ui/Ui4 as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion in period i we assume: 
(i) aR2tac2 < o, 
(ii) aR 2tac 1 > o, 
(iii) aR 2taL = o. 
In (i) we assume the individual displays Arrow-Pratt decreasing absolute risk aversion in period 2; (ii) is Sandmo's 
[9,10] assumption on the intertemporal ranking of consumption bundles; assumption (iii) states that risk aversion is invar-
iant with respect to the labor supply decision and intuitively means that the odds demanded by the agent for taking a 
risky action are not affected by how much he works.S 
Pure Income Uncertainty 
We begin by examining the case where the individual's income is not uniquely determined by his factor allocation 
but contains a stochastic component which is independent of the labor-savings decision. The wage rate and the return 
earned by savings are both taken to be known. Under these conditions the agent's consumptions in the two periods are 
(1) cl = yl - sand 
(2) c2 = (1 +x)S + Y~ 
where Y 1 = Y~ + wL.6 In this section we take Y2 to be a random variable which is distributed independently of the 
labor-saving decision and hence represents the stochastic analog of a neoclassical lump sum income transfer. 
The agent's labor-savings decision is determined by 
(3) max foo0 U(C 1 ,c2,L)f(Y~)dY2 
L,C1 
subject to (1) and (2) above. We assume 0 ( L ( L and c1 ) 0 , where Lis total time available.7 f(YJ) represents the 
individual's subjective probability density on Y2 and reflects his beliefs as to the intervals in which Y 2 is likely to lie. 
3For example, see the Arrow reference cited above. 
4 As usual, sub~_-ripts denote partial derivatives; e.g. U 1 = au,ac I and U 12 = a2 utac 1 ac2 . Also note that R i) 0 for the case of risk averse behavior. 
5Condition (iii) is a special case of the restriction used in Block and Heineke [ 31 and permits generalizing the Arrow-Pratt restriction to 
the case where income is generated in the labor market. 
6
we have chosen to use the amonn~ consumed (in period one) as the decision variable as did Sandmo [ 101. An alternative specification is 
to choose the proportion of income consumed as the decision variable. This approach was adopted by Leland [ S j. 
7 For simplicity we have res tricted our problem to the case where optimal values of Land c 1 are "internal". Extension via Kuhn-Tucker to include act ivity boundary constraints is s traightforward . 
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Defining F=EU[C1,Y2 + (l+x)(Yf + wL- C1) ,L] necessary and sufficient conditions for a relative maximum 
(4) FL = E(U2w(l+x) + UL) = 0 
(5) F1 = E(U1 - (l+x)U2) = 0 
We now turn to deducing the allocative consequences of a change in the amount of "pure income uncertainty". 
Formally, changes in the "amount of uncertainty" may be interpreted as shifts in higher central moments of f(Y2 ). 
Since for arbitrary probability distributions the variance of a random variable may be an unsatisfactory measure of disper-
sion we follow the suggestion of Arrow [2) and analyze the effects of a pure dispersion increase by_ means of a multip-
licat ive parameter shift followed by an additive shift which leaves the mean of the variable unaffected. This approach has 
been utilized by Sandmo [9,10,1 1] and Leland [6] .8 
We proceed by changing the dispersion of Y2, perserving the mean, and deducing the effect on the agent's decision. 
To. this end replace Y2, in (4) and (5) with -y1Y2 + e1, where -y1 and e1 are shift parameters, differentiate with 
respect to -y 1 and evaluate the result at -y1 = 1, e1 = 0.9 Thence 
(7) aLja-y1 = [FuE(U12 - (l+x)U22)(Yl - J.L1) - F11E(U22w(l+x) + UL2)(Y~ - J.L1)] /D 
(8) ac1Ja-y1 = [F1LE(U22w(I+x) + UL2) (Yl J.L1) - FLLE(U12 - (l+x)u22) (Y2-M1)]/D 
where MJ = E(Y2). 
Sandmo [10) was able to sign the single decision variable (C1) counterpart to (8) by using assumptions (i) and (ii) 
and the specification that c 1 is a normal commodity.lO Block and Heineke [4) were able to sign the single decision 
variable (L) counterpart to (7) using assumptions (i) and (iii) and the specification that Lis an inferior activity. As would 
be expected, combining these two sets of assumptions does not provide sufficient preference information to sign either of 
the "uncertainty effects", (7) and (8), generated with the expanded model. 
However, it can be shown that assumptions (i) - (iii) above and the specification that the marginal utility of period 
two income is increasing in period one consumption and decreasing in labor are sufficient to sign (7) and (8) if C 1 and 
leisure are net stochastic compliments with respect to mean returns. These latter assumptions imply the Sandmo and 
Block and Heineke postulates, viz. L and c 1 are inferior and normal activities, respectively. The assumption of net sto-
chastic complementarity between present consumption and leisure formalizes the possible time consuming nature of con-
sumption.! I In which case we have :l 2 
8 
For an intuitive account of such "pure increases in dispersion" see Sandmo (1 0 ] . An excellent discussion of alternative interpretations of 
dispersion changes is given in Rothschild and Stiglitz (7 ) . 
9
Leaving E(Y0 ) unchanged amounts to requiring dE()'1 Y~ + 0 1) = 0 and hence d0 1td)'1 = -E(Y~). 
10 
Sandmo [ 1 0] assumed C 1 to be normal commodity in both certain and stochastic worlds. 
II 
Net stochastic complime ntarity between leisure and consu mption implies S 1L (o, whefe S .. is the stochastic net substitution term. Hence, FdL ( 0. For empirical evidence supporting the complemen tarity hypothesas between leid~re and a particular type of consumption , 
see J.D. wen, J.P.E. Vol. 79, no. 1. Note that Owen's evidence makes this assu mption par ticularly appealing at high income levels. 
12 1 I See Appendix for proof. lneq ual.ities (7 ) and (8) are also forthcoming for the case where period one and two both contain a random 
au,tonomous income component. Consideration of changes in the dispersion Y~ evinces the same qualitative results as reported in (71) and 
(8 ) . 
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(7') aL/a-y1 > o 
(8') ac1ta-y1 < o 
and therefore 
Inequality (9) is the result obtained by Leland and by Sandmo in the section of his paper entitled "Income Risk". 
The effect of increased uncertainty on savings while consistent with both Sandmo and Leland has been derived in a 
somewhat more general framework.l3 
Consequently , under our assumptions the agent reacts to increases in income dispersion by both saving more and 
working more. The implication being that the individual "hedges" against increased dispersion by increasing his factor 
income in both periods, which in turn acts as a "buffer" against the increased income uncertainty.l4 
We now see that the frequent references in the literature to the disincentive effects of uncertainty may be mislead-
ing. At least under one seemingly reasonable set of assumptions, increased pure income uncertainty has unambiguous 
incentive effects on the supply of factors -- a result readily explicable in terms of the agent's control of distribution 
parameters. In the case of pure income uncertainty the agent is unable to influence income dispersion, but can influence 
the mean value and uses this control to "compensate" for changes in dispersion.l S 
Some Implications of Pure Income Uncertainty -- Inheritance, because it is invariant to the agent's allocative deci-
sions, is a common fo rm of pure income uncertainty. Here the conventional wisdom stresses the incentive effects of 
uncertain intergenerational transfers. And indeed under our assumptions theory supports the conventional wisdom. If the 
concern of the donor is either to increase the frugality of his potential heirs or to extract more effort, increased uncer-
tainty induced by, say, frequent rewriting of the will is a reasonable strategy . 
On a more serious note, our results suggest an allocative in te1:pre tation of some consequences of political instability. 
For example, instabili ty that increases the amount of uncertain ty surroundir'lg wealth transfers will have factor incentive 
effects. 
In a stable political environment these consequences of political instability may be replicated as a policy tool. 
Although lump sum transfers are prescribed in a deterministic world for purely distributive purposes, if the incidence of 
these taxes is randomized they create income uncertainty and may be used for directly allocative purposes.l6 In under-
developed countries, our resul ts suggest an increase in the supply of savings and labor may be accomplished by means of a 
poll tax of random incidence. In practice this would involve subjecting all individuals to the possibility of negative or 
positive poll taxes. The final tax rate would be unknown and all that would be specified would be the pattern of possible 
taxes and the expected value of such transfers (zero in the pure dispersion increasing case.) 
Uncertainty in Factor Returns 
Above we examined the effect on the household's labor-savings decision of changes in pure income uncertainty : The 
case where stochastic elements are independent of the factor allocation decision. We next consider the possibility that 
factors themselves may earn uncertain renumerations. 
Formally the agent's labor-savings supply decision is given by 
13see eq uat ion (9) in Sand mo [ 10 I and equation ( I S) in Leland ( 5 I . 
14 Altho ugh o ur inter pretatio n is in terms o f a risk averse agent, similar results, (7
1
)and (8\ are for thcoming for a restricte d set of risk 
takers. 
15Sandmo [I 0 I provides a similar interpretat ion in the saving only mode l. 
16Th is policy prescription ignores the normative aspects of changing inco me dispers io n. Howeve r, the posit ive e lem ents (factor supply 
effects) are o bvio usly applicable to pare to relevant decreases in such dispersio n. 
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0000 0( 0 (IO)maxf 0 f -I U(C 1,Y2 + l+x)(Y1 +wL - C1),L)f(w,x)dxdw, 
L,C 1 
where w } 0 and x > - 1 are random variables. The function f(w,x) is the agent's subjective probability distribution on 
factor returns. As before we assume 0 ( L (Land c1 } 0. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum are given by 
equations (4) - (6) as before. 
Wage Rate Uncertainty --We now investigate the consequences of a change in the agent's beliefs which conclude that 
the renumeration earned by his labor has become more uncertain. (Such a calculation may occur, for example, on the 
introduction of imperfectly predictable wage controls.) 
Analytically' increased wage dispersion may be studied by replacing w with 'Y2 w + e 2 in ( 4) and ( 5), differentiating 
with respect to r2 and evaluating the result at r2 = 1, 02 = 0 , where~= E(w). We have 
- [F 11EU2(w- JL2)(1+x)] /D + L[FuE(l+x)(U12 - ( l+x)U22)(w-~)­
F l1 E(l+x) (U22w(l+x)+UL2)(w-~)] /D 
[F 1 LEU2(w-~)(l+x)] /D + L[F1LE(l+x)(U22w(l+x) + UL2)(w-~) ­
FLL E( l+x) (U 12-( l+x)U22)(w-~)] /D 
Equations (II) and (12) are Slutsky-like equations composed of an " uncertainty substitution effect" and an "income 
uncertainty effect".l7 Since EU2(w-~) (I+x) = Cov(U2(l+x),w) its sign depends upon u22 , which for risk averse indivi-
duals is negative. Hence EU2(w-~)(1 +x) is negative. F 11 and F l L (by the net stochastic complementarity of leisure and 
c1) are each negative and therefore uncertainty substitution effects are negative and positive respectively. 
A compensated increase in the dispersion of the wage rate would result in a decrease in the individual's labor alloca-
tion and in his savings .l8 The sign of the direct substitution effect - [F 11 EU2(w-~)(l+x)] /D follows, as indicated 
above, from risk aversion and conforms quite closely to intuitive notions concerning the implications of such behavior. 
One would expect that an increase in the dispersion of the wage rate would lead the risk averse agent to substitute away 
from labor. The sign of the cross substitution effect [F lL EU2(w-~)(l+x)] /D is determined by risk aversion and the 
specification that leisure and c1 are net stochastic compliments with respect to mean value changes. Therefore, the quali-
tative effects of a compensated increase in the mean value of the wage rate will be the same as the effects of a compen-
sated decrease in the dispersion of the wage rate.l 9 This is true for both the direct and cross substitution effects and 
emphasizes the possibility of interpreting dispersion changes as changes in costs.20 
17 Note that if we require ac2 t(}y 2 = 0 the n : 
(a) (aL/Cfy2 )U=Uo =- ( F 11 EU2(w·JL2 )(1+x) ] /D 
(b) (ac 1t(}y2)U=Uo = (F1LEU2(w- JL 2)(l+x) ) /D 
In deriving (a) and (ba) the dispersio n of w is allowed to change, but t he agent is compensated in such a manner that the distributio n of 
C is unaltered. Conceptually such a co mpensation is performed by transforming Y0 into a random variable that leaves the distribution of 
c
2 invariant to the dispersion change in w. Since under these condit io ns dU = 0 , ?a) and (b) are essentially the Slutsky substitut ion terms 
fl.- this class of pure dispersion changes. Moreover, the remaining terms in (11) and (12) above may be interpreted, in a straightforward 
manner, as the income uncertainty effects of a change in ')'2 . 
18The sign of (asta-y2)U=Uo follows immediat ely from ( 11), ( 12) and the identity S = Y 1 - C 1. 
19similar results are presented for forward exchange positions in Leland [ 6 ] . 
20see Block and Heineke ( 4 ) and Leland [ 6 ] for discussions of this interpretation. 
21
see Appendix for proof. 
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Since changes in the dispersion of the wage rate effect the dispersion of income, equations (11) and ( 12) include 
income uncertainty terms. Under our assumptions these terms are positive and negative respectively .21 
Transforming to the savings variable we see that income uncertainty effects of a change in wage dispersion are posi-
tive for both savings and labor. Therefore , both oL/o12 and oS/o12 are indeterminate in sign and it is not possible to 
make unequivocal assertions as to the allocative consequences of changes in wage rate uncertainty . Hence, statements such 
as Rottenberg's [8] assertion that theft induced insecurity is likely to result in a decreased labor allocation require sub-
stantial qualification. Clearly one must have relative magnitude information before an unambiguous assessment of the 
supply effects of uncertainty is possible. 
Nonetheless, fo r "small " labor allocations we would expect the substitu tion terms to dominate while for " large" 
allocations the income terms may dominate.22 For example, a "semi-retired" individual might react to increased wage 
uncertainty by entirely withdrawing from the labor force and simultaneously increasing his present consumption. Exactly 
the opposite supply responses might be expected from changes in conscription procedures that increase the dispersion of 
returns to labor. Since draftees are likely to be "full time" labor force participants such changes in procedures may elicit 
an increase in voluntary effort supplied (overtime) as well as a decrease in present consumption . 
Savings Rate Uncertainty - In this section we determine the response of the agent's labor-savings decision to increas-
ed clispersion in x. We proceed as in the previous case : Replacing x in (4) and (5) with 1 3x + e3, differentiating and 
evaluating at 1 3 = I , 83 = 0, with E(x) = 11-J• we have 
(13) 3L/3'Y3 = - [F 11 EU2 w(x- P-J) + Fu EU2(x- P-J)) /D + S [Fu E(U 12 - (I +x)U22) (x - JJ..3) -
F ll E(U22w(l+x) + UL2) (x-P-J)] /D 
(14) ac1ta'Y3 = [F1LEU2w(x- P-J) + FLLEU2 (x- P-J)]/D + S[F1LE(U22w(l+x) + UL2)(x - P-J) -
FLLE(U12 - (l+x) u22) (x - J.l3)] /D 
Uncertainty substitution effects in (13) and (14) are negative and positive respectively by an argument analogous to that 
used in our discussion of wage uncertainty. Again compensated increases in the dispersion of returns to saving will 
decrease work effort and saving. And again the assumption of risk aversion and net stochastic complimentarily between 
present consumption and leisure result in intuitively plausible clirect and cross substitution terms. 
Because the clispersion of the returns to saving is increased income is more uncertain and the total savings rate 
uncertainty effects (3L/3'Y3 and ac1 /3'Y3) include income uncertainty terms. As before our assumptions imply these 
terms are positive and negative respectively. Consequently uncertainty substitution and income effects in the expressions 
for 3L/a'Y3 and asta'Y3 will be negative and positive respec tively in each case, and, as in the case of wage uncertainty, 
total effects depend upon relative magnitudes. This is essentially a generalization of the result Sandmo [ 1 0] obtained in 
his analysis of the saving decision under conclitions of "capital risk."23 Equation (14) contains the same qualitative impli-
cations as his result; however, in this model it is derived within the context of the household's joint labor-savings 
decision.24 
Tre relative magnitude aspects of savings rate uncertainty may be illustrated by considering the incentive effects of 
monetary policy. Specifically, replacing cliscretionary policy with automatic rules would most likely decrease the disper-
sion of returns to financial assets. The saving incentive effects of this action may depend upon the income position of the 
agent. "High income" groups may decrease their allocation to saving and effort while "low income" groups actually 
22Th is s tatement presu mes the existence of an L 0 such that substitution terms dominate for L ( L 0 and income terms dominate for L ( 
L 0 . Of course the c ritical value o f L, if it exists, that causes the "total uncertainty effects" to change s ign will in general be different for 
3L{cry2 and oC t{cry2 . 
23
see eq uatiun (t2) in Sandmo [tO] . 
24 A so mewhat diffe ren t specification of the joint labo r-savings dec ision under condit ions of "capital risk " is invest igated in Block and 
ll~ineke [ 3[ . 
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increase their factor allocations. The aggregate effect on the supply of factors would then depend upon the income distri-
bution. 
Summary 
We have examined two types of income uncertainty: Pure income uncertainty and factor return uncertainty. In the 
former the stochastic term is independent of the factor allocation while in the latter the returns to factors themselves are 
stochastic. 
It has been shown that, under a quite plausible set of assumptions, increases in pure income uncertainty have unam-
biguous incentive effects. The allocation to savings and labor increase as the dispersion of autonomous income increases. 
This is essentially a generalization of Leland [5] and Sandmo's [1 0] " income risk" results. Nonetheless, deriving their 
savings results within our expanded household decision problem required additional preference restrictions. Significantly, 
the set of conditions that were sufficient to derive the Leland-Sandmo results (aC1Jar1 ( 0) imply the analogous labor 
result (aLtar 1 > 0). 
In addition to these pure income uncertainty results, we were able to generalize the previous work on uncertain 
factor returns. The labor and saving incentive effects of changes in the dispersion of the wage rate as well as the returns 
to savings were derived. Direct and cross dispersion effects were analyzed in each case and, under our assumptions, the 
ambiguity noted by Sandmo [1 0] appears to be quite general. Neither increases in the dispersion of the wage rate nor 
savings rate produced unequivocal incentive effects in direct or cross markets. 
The crucial distinction between the agent's response to increases in "pure" income uncertainty and increases in fac-
tor return uncertainty lies in the effect any factor reallocation will have on the dispersion of income. In the case of 
increases in "pure" income uncertainty the agent is able to increase mean income without changing its dispersion, and 
hence, as was noted above, is able to "hedge" the increased dispersion with a higher expected income. However, in the 
case of increases in factor return uncertainty increasing expected income automatically increases income dispersion. The 
former increases expected utility while, for a risk averse agent, the latter decreases expected utility. Only relative magni-
tude information can reconcile the two conflicting responses. 
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Appendix 
Define 
To show aLja-y 1 > 0 and ac 1 Ja-y 1 < 0 express equations (7) and (8) as: 
(I) aLja-y1 = [-F11Cov(A,Y~ + FuCov(B,Y~)]/D 
and 
Under assumptions (i) - (iii) and those detailed following equation (8), A and B increase and decrease, respectively, 
in Y~. Hence, second order conditions and the specification that leisure and c1 are net stochastic complements imply (I) and (2) are positive and negative respectively. 
In a similar manner it can be shown th at "income uncertainty effects" are positive in the expressions for aL/a-r2 and 
aLja-y3 and negative in the expressions for ac 1 ja-y2 and ac1 ja-y3. 
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